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ABSTRACT
This Article will discuss the interplay between citizenship, race,
and ratification of statehood in the United States, both
historically and prospectively. Part II will discuss the
development and history of the Insular Cases and the creation of
the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine (“TID”), focusing on the
Territory of Puerto Rico and how the issues of citizenship, race,
and statehood have evolved in shadow of empire as a result. Part
III will look back on the admission to the Union of New Mexico
and Arizona—the forty-seventh and forty-eighth states—and
discuss the substantial difficulties these territories had in getting
admitted for statehood due to their majority non-white, Spanishspeaking populations. This section also reflects on the de facto
requirement of whiteness as a prerequisite for statehood as
exemplified by the larger struggle for territorial statehood in the
West, and the detrimental impact that the culture of white
supremacy has had on the ability of territories to achieve full
membership in our society. Part IV will examine the factors
surrounding the admission of our fiftieth State, Hawai’i, and the
impact that its large Native Hawaiian and other Asian/Pacific
Islander population had on its quest for statehood. This part will
also examine the strategic reasons that the United States pursued
statehood for Hawai’i, due to its location in the South Pacific and
the need to defend the West Coast of the United States after World
War II and the Korean War. Part V discusses the unique status
of the District of Columbia which, while not a territory, is a
modern corollary to the issues of colonialism, race, and statehood
that the territories have historically faced when seeking
admission to the Union. Finally, the Article concludes with a
discussion about the inability of United States citizens who are
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residents of the United States territories to elect voting members
to Congress and reflects on how this disenfranchisement of
majority-minority territories has prevented the United States
from becoming a truly representative democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

“States are not made, nor patched; they grow.” 1
The power to admit new states to the Union is granted to Congress
by Article IV of the United States Constitution. 2 It would seem, to a
casual observer of American democracy, that territories of the United
States would be likely—if not presumptive—candidates for admission to
statehood. However, territories of the United States have historically
faced a long, difficult road to statehood in Congress. 3 Although the
specific reasons for Congressional opposition to territorial statehood are
varied, there is a common thread that runs through the travails of the
territories in their quest for statehood—the supremacy of whiteness as
an implicit prerequisite for full membership in the Union. 4
At the heart of the question of the rights of territorial residents is
their entitlement to full membership in the Union as jus soli citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 5 As
in the case of Puerto Rico, the United States government has long
maintained that persons born in the United States territories are not
constitutionally entitled to United States citizenship. 6 This position is
based on the fact that because Puerto Rico became subject to United
States sovereignty under the Treaty of Paris of 1898, 7 “the citizenship
status of the Puerto Rican people was subject to the will of Congress,

1. JOHN MASEFIELD, THE EVERLASTING MERCY 52 (1911).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.”).
3. See Roger J. Bell, Admission Delayed: The Influence of Sectional and Political
Opposition in Congress on Statehood for Hawaii, 6 HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 45, 45 (1972) (“[F]ew
territories were admitted to statehood immediately upon fulfilling these criteria for entry.
Most confronted considerable politically-motivated or sectionally-based opposition in
Congress to their statehood objectives.”).
4. See Laura E. Gómez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy: Mexican Elites and
the Rights of Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth-Century New Mexico, 25 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 9, 18–21 (2005).
5. The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States . . . .” See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. See Lisa Maria Perez, Note, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1036 (2008).
7. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,
Spain-U.S., art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris of 1898].
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pursuant to Article IX of that Treaty.” 8 This interpretation of the
interplay between the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Congressional supremacy over “[t]he civil rights and political status
of the native inhabitants of the territories” 9 in fact left the residents of
Puerto Rico stateless for a time following the execution of the Treaty of
Paris:
Although Puerto Ricans were no longer Spanish citizens,
Congress made no pronouncements on the issue of citizenship
until the Foraker Act of 1900 established the first civil
government for Puerto Rico under U.S. federal rule. Under the
Foraker Act, persons born in Puerto Rico were governed almost
exclusively by federal decree, yet the Act declared them to be only
“citizens of Porto Rico.” This was an “anomalous” and essentially
meaningless citizenship status that did not convey Puerto Ricans
any form of sovereignty and was not recognized by other nations.
It was not until the Jones Act of 1917 that all “citizens of Porto
Rico” were declared to be citizens of the United States. 10
In addition, Congress is given the authority under the United States
Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance to “dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.” 11 The Jones Act of 1917 12 and its impact
on Puerto Rican citizenship was discussed in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 13 one
of the cases that makes up of the body of law known as the Insular
Cases. 14 Balzac is known for its decision reasserting the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Downes v. Bidwell 15 that persons born in Puerto Rico had no
constitutional right to United States citizenship. 16 The grant of
8. See Perez, supra note 6, at 1036 n.20 (“Article IX of the treaty provided that ‘[t]he
civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Treaty of Paris of 1898, supra note 7, at art. IX)).
9. Id. (quoting Treaty of Paris of 1898, supra note 7, at art. IX).
10. Id. at 1036–37. Perez further observes that “the grant of citizenship was only
derivative, as the Jones Act did not make birth in Puerto Rico the rule for acquisition of
U.S. citizenship.” Id. at 1037.
11. ROGER BELL, LAST AMONG EQUALS: HAWAIIAN STATEHOOD AND AMERICAN POLITICS
xv (1984) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
12. Jones Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1402).
13. 258 U.S. 298, 305–08 (1922).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
16. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 313 (“[W]e find no features in the [Jones] Act of . . . 1917
from which we can infer the purpose of Congress to incorporate Porto Rico into the United
States with the consequences which would follow.”). In Downes, the Supreme Court stated
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citizenship to the residents of a territory was thus held to be indicative
of the incorporation of that territory, a practice that became known as
the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine (“TID”). 17 This understanding of
the relationship between Congress and the territories has been
characterized “as a matter of Congressional largesse rather than
constitutional command.” 18
The TID’s combination of constitutional authority and congressional
discretion has led to the development of a complicated—and
constitutionally suspect 19 —interpretation of the law of citizenship as
applied to the territories. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in the
Balzac case—perhaps more than any other—exemplifies the
jurisprudence that evolved in the Insular Cases. Additionally, the
treatment of Puerto Rico after its annexation by the United States at the
conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898 is indicative of how the
United States government views the civil rights of territorial residents.
Indeed, when viewed through the tripartite lens of citizenship, race, and
statehood, it is easy to see how the law of the territories have developed
in a manner that virtually guarantees second-class citizenship for
individuals born in the United States territories, notwithstanding their
statutory grants of United States citizenship at birth. 20

that “the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long
continued and uniform to the effect that the Constitution is applicable to territories
acquired by purchase or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct.” 182
U.S. at 278–79.
17. See infra Part II.A.1.
18. Perez, supra note 6, at 1041.
19. See, e.g., Carlos R. Soltero, The Supreme Court Should Overrule the Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine and End One Hundred Years of Judicially Condoned Colonialism,
22 CHICANX-LATINX L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“Can the United States’ Bill of Rights coexist with
colonial rule? Do the guarantees in the Bill of Rights limit what the federal government
may do, consistent with the Constitution, in its territories? Is the current state of
constitutional law in U.S. territories coherent?”).
20. See, e.g., Riley Edward Kane, Note, Straining Territorial Incorporation: Unintended
Consequences from Judicially Extending Constitutional Citizenship, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229,
1231 (2019) (“Fitisemanu v. United States, the most recent action involving the national/
citizen distinction, is currently underway in the Federal District Court for the District of
Utah. John Fitisemanu and his co-plaintiffs currently live in Utah but were born in
American Samoa, and as a result, they are U.S. nationals and did not become U.S. citizens
at birth. The plaintiffs assert their national status unfairly causes them ‘unique obstacles’
in obtaining work, accessing government benefits, and sponsoring the immigration of
family members, and demeans them as second-class Americans. The plaintiffs seek a
decision extending the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to American
Samoans.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d. 115
(D. Utah 2019), rev’d, 1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2021).
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II. PUERTO RICO: AMERICAN EMPIRE
The power of the Congress of the United States over the territories is
“general and plenary.” 21 To the Congress is committed, by the
Constitution, the admission of new States into the Union. 22
The issue of race and language was always at the forefront of the
territorial rights debate. Not only were the newly annexed territories
physically separated from the continental mainland of the United States,
but they were also “populated by established communities whose
inhabitants differed from the dominant stateside societal structure with
respect to their race, language, customs, cultures, religions, and even
legal systems.” 23 Indeed, “[i]n 1898, Spanish was the official language of
Puerto Rico and the vernacular of all of its native inhabitants. It was also
the official language of the Philippines, with a substantial number of
native inhabitants speaking [Spanish] to some degree in their
vernacular, particularly in the cities.” 24
United States Circuit Judge Juan R. Torruella has opined that “the
obvious belief in racial superiority that supported the ‘manifest destiny’
policies expressed by the controlling political factions—is crucial to
understanding how the Insular Cases became the law of the land despite
constitutional and historic precedents that augured a different
outcome.” 25 Judge Torruella has also argued that the decision announced
in the Insular Cases involving TID “is as invidious a doctrine as that
which the same Supreme Court announced in Plessy v. Ferguson.” 26
21. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 42 (1890); see also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138, 140 (1904).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
23. Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 Yale L. &
POL’Y REV. 57, 62–63 (2013) [hereinafter Ruling America’s Colonies] (footnotes omitted). “In
1900, out of a total population of seventy-six million in the United States, 87.9% were white,
11.6% were black, and 0.5% were of other races.” Id. at 63 n.22 (citing FRANK HOBBS &
NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 77
figs.3.3 & 3.4 (2002)).
24. Id. at 63 n.23.
25. Id. at 64.
26. See Soltero, supra note 19, at 1; see also Neil Weare, Why the Insular Cases Must
Become the Next Plessy, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2018), https://
blog.harvardlawreview.org/why-the-insular-cases-must-become-the-next-plessy/
(“[The]
comparison between the Insular Cases and Plessy has force at a number of levels. As a legal
matter, Plessy invented a legal doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ which provided
constitutional cover for America’s system of racial segregation. The Insular Cases, fueled
by the same racial impulses as Plessy, devised a new category of ‘unincorporated’
territories, providing a constitutional justification for ruling the populations of overseas
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A. The Insular Cases: “Political Apartheid” 27
The Insular Cases are a series of United States Supreme Court cases
decided between 1901 and 1922 that interpreted the constitutional status
of the insular territories of the United States. 28 In the Insular Cases, the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the following language of
Article IX of the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American War of
1898: “[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
the territories . . . ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.” 29 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of this language
answered the fundamental constitutional question concerning the status
of the territories: “[D]oes the Constitution follow the flag[?]” 30 And, in the
case of Puerto Rico, was it “excluded from the term ‘United States’ simply
because it was a territory rather than a State?” 31
Because Puerto Rico is an “unincorporated” territory, it is not part of
the United States in the Constitutional sense. 32 In addition to Judge
territories without regard to traditional constitutional limitations or democratic
principles.”).
27. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political
Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283 (2007) [hereinafter The Establishment of a Regime of
Political Apartheid].
28. Reference to the Insular Cases generally includes the following Supreme Court
decisions: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91
(1914); Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325 (1911); New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909); Kent v. Porto
Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Trono v. United
States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), abrogated
by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Mendezona y Mendezona v. United States, 195
U.S. 158 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Gonzales v. Williams, 192
U.S. 1 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawai’i v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903); Pepke v. United States (The Diamond Rings), 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Huus v.
N.Y. & P.R. Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Crossman v. United States, 105 F. 608 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900), rev’d sub nom. Goetze v. United
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); and Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901). Perez,
supra note 6, at 1034 n.13 (citing Efrén Rivera Ramos, Deconstructing Colonialism: The
“Unincorporated Territory” as a Category of Domination, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE:
PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 104, 105 n.4 (Christina Duffy
Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001)).
29. Treaty of Paris of 1898, supra note 7, at art. IX.
30. See Ruling America’s Colonies, supra note 23, at 64.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Perez, supra note 6, at 1029 (“[Pursuant] to the doctrine of territorial incorporation
established in the Insular Cases, Puerto Rico is an ‘unincorporated’ territory, and as such,
it does not form part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution. As a
result, persons born in Puerto Rico are not ‘born in the United States’ under the Fourteenth
Amendment and are not constitutionally entitled to citizenship. Because they enjoy only
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Torruella’s argument that the decision in the Insular Cases is on par with
Plessy in the annals of bad decisions by the Supreme Court, the TID
announced in the Insular Cases has also been analogized to the Court’s
1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford 33:
In response to Dred Scott, the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionalized the common law doctrine of jus soli, which
provides that all persons born on U.S. territory and not subject to
the jurisdiction of another sovereign are native-born citizens,
regardless of race. Pursuant to this interpretation of the
Citizenship Clause, persons born in Puerto Rico have been “born
in the United States” since the ratification of the Treaty of Paris.
By retroactively narrowing the scope of the term “United States,”
the Supreme Court took advantage of the unique geographical
circumstances of the insular territories and prevented their
inhabitants from obtaining equal citizenship. Thus, the doctrine
of territorial incorporation reasserts Dred Scott’s race-based
approach to citizenship and should be overruled. 34
So why have the Insular Cases been compared to two of the Court’s most
notoriously racist decisions? At least in the case of Puerto Rico and the
other unincorporated United States territories, the answer lies in the
Court’s creation of the TID. 35
1. Downes v. Bidwell and the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine
One of the primary holdings in the Insular Cases is what has become
known as the TID. 36 Legal scholars generally agree that the concept of
TID was first announced by Justice White in his concurrence in the
Court’s 1901 decision in Downes v. Bidwell. 37 In Downes, Justice White
statutory citizenship, Congress arguably is able to expatriate most Puerto Ricans if the
island is declared independent.”).
33. 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Frederic R.
Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 60 AM. U.L. REV. 801,
811, 841 (1926).
34. Perez, supra note 6, at 1029 (emphasis added).
35. See generally Coudert, supra note 33.
36. See id. at 802, 806.
37. 182 U.S. 244, 311–21, 339 (1901) (White, J., concurring); see, e.g., Ross Dardani,
Citizenship in Empire: The Legal History of U.S. Citizenship in American Samoa, 1899–
1960, 60 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 311, 326–27 (2020) (“Justice Edward Douglas White’s
concurring and precedent-setting opinion in Downes ‘is still cited in territorial matters as
the authoritative answer to the question of the Constitutional status of the territories’”
(quoting ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED
STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 23 (1989))).
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argued that there should be a difference in the constitutional status of
incorporated and unincorporated United States territories. 38 And such a
difference in constitutional treatment of the territories is not
insubstantial—because Puerto Rico was not incorporated, the Bill of
Rights, among other important constitutional protections, did not apply
to its citizens. 39
Justice White’s view, and the TID itself, is an extension of Professor
Abbott Lawrence Lowell’s interpretation of the constitutional status of
United States territories, which argued that while certain territories
could be annexed by the United States, other territories could “be so
acquired as not to form part of the United States.” 40 But how is this
distinction made between the various territories, and which factors
should be relied upon when applying the TID? Among the most troubling
aspects of Justice White’s concurrence—in which he conceives the
fundamental premise underlying all of the Insular Cases—is the
prejudiced, colonialist, and white supremacist attitudes toward native
residents of the territories.
In justifying the use of the TID, Justice White “premised his adoption
of the incorporation test in Downes on the right of the American people
to determine whether the inhabitants of an acquired territory were
sufficiently ‘civilized’ to allow admission of their native lands as
‘component constituents of the Union which composed the United
States.’” 41 Using the colonialist language of the day, Justice White thus
concluded that Puerto Rico was “foreign to the United States in a
domestic sense” because it had not been incorporated by Congress. 42 The
words Justice White chose to use in his concurrence describing the native
peoples of the territories, such as “savage” and “uncivilized,” 43 reflect the
38. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 299 (White, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 341–42.
40. Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions—A Third View,
13 HARV. L. REV. 155, 176 (1899).
41. See Perez, supra note 6, at 1040–41 (first quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 279–80
(Brown, J., majority opinion); and then quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 326 (White, J.,
concurring)).
42. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341–42 (White, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 302, 306. Justice White’s concurrence in Downes is replete with racially
offensive slurs describing the native inhabitants of the territories. Id. (“[I]f the conquered
are a fierce, savage, and restless people, he may, according to the degree of their indocility,
govern them with a tighter rein, so as to curb their ‘impetuosity, and to keep them under
subjection.’ . . . Take a case of discovery. Citizens of the United States discover an unknown
island, peopled with an uncivilized race, yet rich in soil, and valuable to the United States
for commercial and strategic reasons.”). Justice Brown’s majority opinion contains similarly
offensive language. Id. at 287 (Brown, J., majority) (“There seems to be no middle ground
between this position and the doctrine that if their inhabitants do not become, immediately
upon annexation, citizens of the United States, their children thereafter born, whether
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racist and discriminatory beliefs underlying his legal doctrine of how and
when full constitutional protections must be extended to territorial
residents.
The white supremacist jurisprudence in Downes is also revealed by
Justice Brown’s invention of a distinction between those who are “subject
to the jurisdiction” of the United States and those who are “of” the United
States in his majority opinion. 44 This difference, put more plainly, holds
that non-white people are not entitled to full membership in our Republic
due to the fact that they do not share the same “Anglo-Saxon” race and
culture as the British settler colonists who led the American War of
Independence:
There are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the
Anglo-Saxon character, which need no expression in
constitutions or statutes to give them effect . . . . [S]ome cases . . .
may bring about conditions which would render the annexation
of distant possessions desirable. If those possessions are
inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs,
laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought, the
administration of government and justice, according to AngloSaxon principles, may for a time be impossible; and the question
at once arises whether large concessions ought not to be made for
a time, that ultimately our own theories may be carried out, and
the blessings of a free government under the Constitution
extended to them. 45
Justice White’s concurrence also embraces Justice Brown’s view that
Anglo-Saxon culture is virtuous in a way that is not shared by other races
and cultures, and that native inhabitants of conquered territories may
not be deserving of the same sort of rights and liberties as those “of” the
United States—white settlers. 46
Thus, the Downes case set the stage for the future of the citizens in
Puerto Rico as a subject of the American Empire—people that are lessthan full citizens of the United States through a grant of a secondary
form of citizenship by the grace of Congress, 47 but not afforded the goldsavages or civilized, are such, and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of
citizens. If such be their status, the consequences will be extremely serious.”).
44. Id. at 278, 282–83 (Brown, J., majority opinion).
45. Id. at 280, 286–87.
46. See id. at 306 (White, J., concurring).
47. See Charles R. Venator-Santiago, The Law that Made Puerto Ricans U.S. Citizens,
yet Not Fully American, ZÓCALO PUB. SQUARE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://
www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/03/06/law-made-puerto-ricans-u-s-citizens-yet-not-fully-
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standard form of constitutional citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B. Constitutional Colonialism
After the Court’s decision in Downes, which has been summarized as
holding that “the Constitution [f]ollows the [f]lag. . . but [d]oesn’t [q]uite
[c]atch [u]p with [i]t” 48 the question posed by Justice White’s concurrence
in that same decision was whether the territories may be treated
differently under the Constitution based on whether they have been
incorporated by Congress. 49 In 1904, the Supreme Court embraced
Justice White’s theory of TID in the Downes concurrence with its ruling
in Dorr v. United Sates. 50 In Dorr, Justice Harlan stated that the
Constitution was “the supreme law of the land,” but the territories were
“not part of the ‘land.’” 51 Scholar Ross Dardani has described the
decisions in the Insular Cases as the “[c]onstitutional [l]egitimation of
U.S. [e]mpire”:
The initial decisions of the Insular Cases were decided at the turn
of the twentieth century. They materialized in a society in which
white supremacy was a[s]cendant [sic] and Jim Crow’s “separate
but equal” policy had been deemed constitutional by the Supreme
Court, yet they remain the seminal decisions informing U.S.
territorial doctrine both in the unincorporated areas and
beyond. 52
From the outset, the constitutional treatment of United States
territories was akin to the way the British Empire harvested and
american/ideas/essay/ (“Congress replaced the Jones Act with the Nationality Act of 1940.
It extended a statutory form of birthright or jus soli citizenship to Puerto Rico that was
anchored in the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the
Nationality Act of 1940, birth in Puerto Rico was now tantamount to birth in the United
States. Since 1940, Congress has enacted several laws that affirm the Nationality Act’s
citizenship provisions for Puerto Rico and grant all persons born in the island U.S. nativeborn citizenship status.”).
48. Pedro A. Malavet, “The Constitution Follows the Flag . . . but Doesn’t Quite Catch
Up with It”: The Story of Downes v. Bidwell, in RACE LAW STORIES 111, 111 n.1 (Rachel F.
Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) (“This is the quoted response of then Secretary of
War Elihu Root when—after hearing a reading of the five opinions of the Supreme Court
in the Downes case—confused reporters asked how the Justices had replied to the question
‘Does the constitution follow the flag?’”).
49. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 287–88 (White, J., concurring).
50. 195 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1904).
51. Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Dardani, supra note 37, at 323 (footnotes omitted).
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maintained its colonial regime. 53 Dardani argues that after 1898, the
Insular Cases created “a new form of U.S. territorial policy” by combining
traditional elements of both British colonialism and imperialism. 54
1. Balzac v. Porto Rico 55
The Court’s 1922 decision in Balzac v. Porto Rico presents a very
significant limitation to the constitutional rights of territorial citizens. In
a unanimous decision, the Court held that because Puerto Rico is not of
the United States, it is outside of the protection of certain portions of the
Constitution, including the Sixth Amendment. 56 With this decision, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed TID in a way that had repercussions not just
for the residents of Puerto Rico, but for all inhabitants of the various
United States territories.
The decision in Balzac v. Porto Rico is important in the Insular Cases
jurisprudence because the Supreme Court held that Puerto Rican
citizenship was “a matter of Congressional largesse rather than
constitutional command.” 57 The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim in
Balzac that because section 5 of the Jones Act declared “citizens of Porto
Rico” to be United States citizens, the Territory of Puerto Rico had thus
been incorporated into the United States 58:

53. Id. at 318–20, 324 (“The main strategy of this new territorial policy would be for
the United States to shift ‘from absorbing new territories into the domestic space of the
nation to acquiring foreign colonies and protectorates abroad.’” (quoting AMY KAPLAN, THE
ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE 2 (2002))).
54. Id. at 324 (“The main difference between U.S. colonialism and imperialism before
1898 was the intent the United States had for the territory in question. U.S. colonialism
was premised on acquiring territory that was understood to be on a path toward statehood,
while U.S. imperialism was based on temporary occupation of a territory, which establishes
U.S. sovereignty over an area but with no intention of having that territory become a state.”
(emphasis omitted)).
55. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
56. Id. at 304–05 (“We have now to inquire whether that part of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution, which requires that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, applies to Porto Rico. . . . It is well settled that these provisions for jury trial in
criminal and civil cases apply to the Territories of the United States. . . . But it is just as
clearly settled that they do not apply to territory belonging to the United States which has
not been incorporated into the Union.”).
57. Perez, supra note 6, at 1041.
58. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 307 (“The section of the Jones Act which counsel press on us is
section 5. This in effect declares that all persons who under the Foraker Act were made
citizens of Porto Rico and certain other residents shall become citizens of the United States,
unless they prefer not to become such.”).
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The Insular Cases revealed much diversity of opinion in this
Court as to the constitutional status of the territory acquired by
the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish War, but the Dorr case
shows that the opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority,
in Downes v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the
[C]ourt. . . . The question before us, therefore, is: Has Congress,
since the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 77), enacted
legislation incorporating Porto Rico into the Union? Counsel for
the plaintiff in error give, in their brief, an extended list of acts,
to which we shall refer later, which they urge as indicating a
purpose to make the island a part of the United States, but they
chiefly rely on the Organic Act of Porto Rico of March 2, 1917 (38
Stat. 951 [Comp. St. §§ 3803a–3803z]), known as the Jones Act
. . . The act is entitled “An act to provide a civil government for
Porto Rico and for other purposes.” It does not indicate by its title
that it has a purpose to incorporate the island into the Union. It
does not contain any clause which declares such purpose or effect.
While this is not conclusive, it strongly tends to show that
Congress did not have such an intention. 59
In determining that Puerto Rico had not been incorporated into the
United States through the Jones Act, the Court once again relied on the
alleged supremacy of individuals of “Anglo-Saxon origin” and the
supposed inherent differences of the native people of the territories:
Congress has thought that a people like the Filipinos, or the Porto
Ricans, trained to a complete judicial system which knows no
juries, living in compact and ancient communities, with definitely
formed customs and political conceptions, should be permitted
themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt this
institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when. 60
The racist and patronizing language of the Balzac decision, in which
the citizens of the Philippines and Puerto Rico are described as living in
“compact and ancient communities,” 61 underscores the argument that
the decisions in the Insular Cases create an unequal and lesser form of
membership in our Union for territorial citizens that is based on racial
stereotypes. On the issue of territorial citizenship, the application of
these biases is not just hurtful—it is harmful and serves to justify the
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 310.
Id.
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denial of civil rights to the citizens of Puerto Rico. The Court in Balzac
referred to the territories as “distant ocean communities” 62 and used the
physical distance of the territories from the continental mainland of the
United States to justify the limited application of the Federal
Constitution to the territories. 63
Indeed, in denying territorial citizens the full protection of the
Constitution, the Court in Balzac purported to be respecting the cultural
norms and traditions of the territorial citizens. But again, relying on its
previous decision in Dorr, the colonialist language used by the Court
belies its assertions:
[I]f the United States shall acquire by treaty the cession of
territory having an established system of jurisprudence, where
jury trials are unknown, but a method of fair and orderly trial
prevails under an acceptable and long-established code, the
preference of the people must be disregarded, their established
customs ignored, and they themselves coerced to accept, in
advance of incorporation into the United States, a system of trial
unknown to them and unsuited to their needs. We do not think it
was intended, in giving power to Congress to make regulations
for the territories, to hamper its exercise with this condition. 64
The argument in Balzac that the citizens of the territories would be
“coerced to accept . . . a system of trial unknown to them and unsuited to
their needs” 65 is not only protectionist, but also, as Judge Torruella
62. Id. at 311.
63. Id. at 308–09. The majority decision in Balzac takes pains to emphasize that if
territorial residents wanted to avail themselves of the full protection of the United States
Constitution, they are free to move and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
continental United States:
It became a yearning of the Porto Ricans to be American citizens, therefore, and
this act gave them the boon. What additional rights did it give them? It enabled
them to move into the continental United States and becoming residents of any
state there to enjoy every right of any other citizen of the United States, civil, social
and political.
Id. at 308. For a skeptical criticism of this assertion, see The Establishment of a Regime of
Political Apartheid, supra note 27, at 327 (“Last but not least is the absurdity of the Balzac
ruling when one considers Taft’s conclusion that upon moving to the U.S. mainland, Puerto
Ricans ipso facto acquired the full rights of U.S. citizens, including ‘the responsibilities of
jurors’ and participation in ‘popular government,’ yet in that same opinion Taft considered
that these same activities were beyond their comprehension while in Puerto Rico. One
cannot but ponder as to how this magical transformation was accomplished.”).
64. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310 (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904)).
65. Id.
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argues, “without any basis in the record or the facts,” and asserts that
the decision in the case was “a predetermined outcome” due to Justice
Taft’s racial and political biases. 66
As Justice Black said in Reid v. Covert, “neither the [decisions in the
Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be given any further
expansion.” 67 He continued:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when
they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise
is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would
destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the
basis of our government. If our foreign commitments become of
such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily
operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that
instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes.
But we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it
which are not there. 68
Unfortunately, Justice Black’s warning about the Insular Cases was
not heeded. As such, Puerto Ricans and other territorial citizens are left
with the system of constitutional colonialism that this jurisprudence
created in the early twentieth century. As the people of Puerto Rico look
forward to the future and contemplate their rights as territorial citizens,
an additional unresolved issue looms on the horizon—the pursuit of
statehood.
C. Contemporary Puerto Rico, the Continuing Struggle for Equality,
and the Pursuit of Statehood
“It hurts to say [Puerto Rico] is a colony because we know that
colonies are violent and do not prosper . . . [b]ut it is our reality . . . it is
the only reality I have ever known.” 69
In recent years, Puerto Rico has faced unprecedented challenges. The
biggest of these challenges was Hurricane Maria, which devastated the
66. The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, supra note 27, at 326.
67. 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
68. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
69. Christina Colón, Will Puerto Rico Become the 51st State?, SOJOURNERS (Aug. 2021),
https://sojo.net/magazine/august-2021/will-puerto-rico-become-51st-state (first alteration
in original) (quoting Ishbel Cora Rodríguez, a student at the University of Puerto Rico in
San Juan).
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island when it made landfall on September 20, 2017. 70 The catastrophic
damage wrought on Puerto Rico by Hurricane Maria—which was the
deadliest hurricane in Puerto Rican history since 1899, 71 and “the third
costliest hurricane” ever in the United States 72 —was made worse by the
United States government’s dereliction of duty in providing for the safety
and recovery of the Puerto Rican people. 73 It is estimated that 2,975
people were killed as a result of the hurricane, many of those due to
government negligence and mismanagement of the aftermath of the
disaster. 74 Indeed, the callous attitude toward the suffering and pleas for
assistance of Puerto Ricans by then-President Donald J. Trump was
epitomized when he threw paper towels to a church crowd begging for
help in San Juan in October 2017, which he later falsely defended as
welcomed and celebrated by the Puerto Rican people. 75
70. E.g., Alexa Lardieri, Hurricane Maria Makes Landfall in Puerto Rico, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/201709-20/hurricane-maria-makes-landfall-in-puerto-rico.
71. See Puerto Rico: A Tale of Two Hurricanes, DAILY WORLD (Sept. 22, 2018), https://
www.thedailyworld.com/opinion/puerto-rico-a-tale-of-two-hurricanes/ (“The 120-year epic
tragedy of Puerto Rico can be told as a tale of two hurricanes. The one fresh in our memory
is Maria, which reached Puerto Rico a year ago. The other was Hurricane San Ciriaco in
1899, which devastated the island just after it became part of the United States.”).
72. See Nicole Acevedo, Puerto Rico Sees More Pain and Little Progress Three Years
After Hurricane Maria, NBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/
puerto-rico-sees-more-pain-little-progress-three-years-after-n1240513 (“Hurricane Maria
resulted in about $90 billion in damage, making it the third costliest hurricane in U.S.
history.”).
73. See id. (“Three years later, there’s frustration that crises have only compounded—
there have been a series of destructive earthquakes and, more recently, the coronavirus
pandemic—while the Trump administration and island officials haven’t made any real
progress updating the island’s antiquated electrical grid and rebuilding destroyed houses.
‘If you put somebody in power, here in Puerto Rico or in the U.S., that’s not prepared to
lead, it’s going to cost you lives, and it’s going to cost you progress,’ said Miguel Soto-Class,
founder and president of the Center for a New Economy, a nonpartisan think tank. ‘I don’t
think it’s an exaggeration to talk about this as a life-or-death issue, because that’s exactly
what we’re seeing.’”).
74. See Ray Sanchez, How Puerto Rico’s Death Toll Climbed from 64 to 2,975 in
Hurricane Maria, CNN (Aug. 29, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/us/
puerto-rico-growing-death-toll/index.html (“The island government raised the official death
toll to 2,975 on Tuesday after maintaining for months that 64 people had died as a result
of the storm.”).
75. See Daniella Silva, Trump Defends Throwing Paper Towels to Hurricane Survivors
in Puerto Rico, NBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
politics-news/trump-defends-throwing-paper-towels-hurricane-survivors-puerto-ricon808861 (“President Donald Trump defended throwing paper towels into a crowd of Puerto
Ricans at a relief center in the hurricane-ravaged territory earlier this week and lauded
federal relief efforts. ‘They had these beautiful, soft towels. Very good towels,’ Trump told
Mike Huckabee during an interview Saturday with Christian network Trinity Broadcasting
. . . ‘And I came in and there was a crowd of a lot of people. And they were screaming and
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As a result of Puerto Rican citizens being treated “like second-class
citizens” in the federal government’s response to Hurricane Maria, 76 a
renewed push for Puerto Rican statehood began to gather steam. 77 Of
course, the statehood debate for Puerto Rico has been occurring since it
became a United States territory in 1898. 78 And since the beginning, the
issue of race and culture of the territories has been at the forefront of the
considerations for whether or not to grant Puerto Rico statehood:
As legal scholar José A. Cabranes explains, white American
legislators thought granting statehood to Puerto Rico would force
the United States to admit the Philippines, which was another
U.S. territory at the time, as well asendanger [sic] the interests
of white laborers and farmers, and increase racial mixing within
the U.S. Instead, they granted Puerto Rico “unorganized
territory” status and offered Puerto Ricans limited selfgovernance without U.S. citizenship. 79
In the twentieth century, white legislators’ concern about how
territorial statehood would detrimentally affect “the interests of white
laborers and farmers” and cause “racial mixing within the U.S.” was a
common refrain in Congress when considering the statehood of U.S.
territories. 80 And, once again, the racist depiction of territorial natives as
they were loving everything. I was having fun, they were having fun,’ he added. ‘They said,
“Throw ‘em to me! Throw ‘em to me Mr. President!” . . . Trump previously sad [sic] he
received nothing but ’thank yous’ after his visit to Puerto Rico on Tuesday.”).
76. Brett Samuels, Ocasio-Cortez: Hurricane Maria Response Shows Puerto Ricans are
‘Treated Like Second-Class Citizens’, HILL (Sept. 16, 2018, 09:27 AM), https://thehill.com/
homenews/sunday-talk-shows/406892-ocasio-cortez-hurricane-maria-response-showspuerto-ricans-are (“Democratic congressional candidate Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (N.Y.)
said Sunday that the Trump administration’s response to Hurricane Maria last year shows
that Puerto Ricans are treated ‘like second-class citizens.’ ‘What we saw in Puerto Rico was
a mass death of 3,000 people. It was the worst humanitarian crisis in modern American
history and many, many people impacted by this storm point to government inaction as the
cause of death,’ Ocasio-Cortez, a self-identified democratic socialist, said on CNN’s ‘State of
the Union.’”).
77. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Puerto Rico is Asking for Statehood. Congress
Should Listen., VOX (Aug. 31, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/31/17793362/
hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-statehood.
78. See Erin Blakemore, Why Puerto Rico has Debated U.S. Statehood Since its
Colonization, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 24, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
history/article/puerto-rico-debated-statehood-since-colonization?cmpid=int_org=ngp::int_
mc=website::int_src=ngp::int_cmp=amp::int_add=amp_readtherest.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 391, 420 (1978) (“Representative Newlands of Nevada, who had dissented in
Committee, noted, the Republican majority feared ‘the establishment of a precedent which
[would] be invoked to control our action regarding the Philippines later on; such action
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“uncivilized” hindered the ability of territories like Puerto Rico and the
Philippines to pursue statehood:
Race, civilization, distance, and economic considerations formed
the basis for the distinction made in Congress between Puerto
Rico and the Philippines. Expressions of concern about the
annexation of Oriental peoples were commonplace. The
statement by Representative Dalzell that he was unwilling “to
see the wage-earner of the United States, the farmer of the
United States, put upon a level and brought into competition with
the cheap half-slave labor, savage labor, of the Philippine
Archipelago” was greeted by loud applause in the House. Other
congressmen echoed his sentiments. 81
Like the Arizona and New Mexico Territories’ bids for statehood, 82
whether a majority of the population of Puerto Rico was non-white was a
critical issue in Congress’ statehood deliberations. 83 The debate over the
racial composition of the citizens of Puerto Rico was hotly debated and
contrasted with the alleged heritage of the citizens of other United States
territories like the Philippines:
Its people are, in the main, of Caucasian blood, knowing and
appreciating the benefits of civilization, and are desirous of
casting their lot with us. . . . How different the case of the
Philippine Islands, 10,000 miles away . . . . The inhabitants are
of wholly different races of people from ours—Asiatics, Malays,
negroes and mixed blood. They have nothing in common with us
and centuries can not assimilate them. . . . They can never be

embracing not simply one island near our coast, easily governed, its people friendly and
peaceful [i.e., Puerto Rico], but embracing an archipelago of seventeen hundred islands
7,000 miles distant, of diverse races, speaking different languages, having different
customs, and ranging all the way from absolute barbarism to semicivilization.’” (alterations
in original)).
81. Cabranes, supra note 80, at 421 (footnotes omitted).
82. See infra Part III.
83. See Cabranes, supra note 80, at 422 (“The relatively tender treatment accorded to
the Puerto Ricans may be partially explained by the representations made in Congress
concerning the racial composition of the island. For example, Representative Payne readily
accepted questionable census reports showing that whites—‘generally full-blooded white
people, descendants of the Spaniards, possibly mixed with some Indian blood, but none of
them [of] negro extraction’—outnumbered by nearly two to one the combined total of
Negroes and mulattoes.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
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clothed with the rights of American citizenship nor their territory
admitted as a State of the American Union . . . . 84
Thus, while current Congressional opposition to Puerto Rican
statehood is not quite as nakedly racist as it was in the twentieth
century, 85 the issues of race and language remain at the forefront of
Puerto Rico’s bid for statehood.
Despite this continuing division in Congress, shortly after the
inauguration of President Biden in early 2021, United States Senator
Robert Menendez of New Jersey and United States Representative Nydia
Velázquez of New York introduced the Puerto Rico Self-Determination
Act of 2021 in the Senate and House, respectively. 86 The purpose of the
Act is described as: “[t]o recognize the right of the People of Puerto Rico
to call a status convention through which the people would exercise their
natural right to self-determination, and to establish a mechanism for
congressional consideration of such decision, and for other purposes.” 87
84. Id. at 424–25. The racist sentiment in Congress against the Filipino people, in
particular, is startling. See, e.g., 33 CONG. REC. 3613, 3616 (1900) (statement of Sen. Bate)
(stating that some Filipinos were “physical[] weaklings of low stature, with black skin,
closely curling hair, flat noses, thick lips, and large, clumsy feet,” and further stated, “[l]et
us not take the Philippines in our embrace to keep them simply because we are able to do
so. I fear it would prove a serpent in our bosom. Let us beware of those mongrels of the
East, with breath of pestilence and touch of leprosy. Do not let them become a part of us
with their idolatry, polygamous creeds, and harem habits.”).
85. 33 CONG. REC. 2172 (1900) (statement of Rep. Gilbert) (cautioning against
“open[ing] wide the door by which these negroes and Asiatics can pour like the locusts of
Egypt into this country”).
86. Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2021, S. 865, 117th Cong. (2021), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/865; Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act
of 2021, H.R. 2070, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/
house-bill/2070.
87. Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2021, S. 865. The Bill contains the following
findings by Congress:
(1) In 1898, the United States defeated the Spanish Kingdom in the SpanishAmerican War and acquired by conquest Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines
pursuant to the Treaty of Paris.
(2) In 1900, Congress established a civilian government on the island through the
Foraker Act. Among other points, that Act established an “executive council”
consisting of various department heads and a presidentially appointed civilian
governor.
(3) The Foraker Act also established the Resident Commissioner position to
represent island interests in Congress. These duties came to include nonvoting
service in the House of Representatives.
(4) In 1901, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Downes v. Bidwell and its progeny
held that for purposes of the Constitution’s Uniformity Clause, Puerto Rico was not
part of the United States and subject to the plenary powers of Congress, which in
turn established a colonial relationship. Justice White, in concurrence, opined that
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The Puerto Rican Self-Determination Act was immediately the
subject of controversy and criticism. 88 Academics immediately criticized
the Bill, arguing in a letter to members of Congress that the proposed
convention process was inadequate:
In a letter sent Monday to a group of bipartisan congressional
leaders, the academics, led by Columbia Law School’s Christina
Ponsa-Kraus, said the Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, which
was introduced by Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-N.Y.), “disserves its
purported goal perpetuating the pernicious myth that [multiple
sovereignty] options exist. They do not.”
“There are two, and only two, real self-determination options for
Puerto Rico: statehood and independence. Yet the Puerto Rico
Self-Determination Act defies constitutional reality by calling
upon Puerto Ricans to define other non-territorial options. There
are no other non-territorial options,” reads the letter, which also
was signed by professors at Harvard Law School. 89

Congress has discretion to decide whether and when to incorporate a territory into
the United States.
(5) Congress recognized Puerto Rico’s authority over matters of internal
governance in 1950 with the passage of the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of
1950 (Public Law 81–600), providing for a constitutional government for the island
which was adopted by Congress as a compact for the people of Puerto Rico and the
subsequent ratification of the island’s constitution in July 1952.
(6) On November 18, 1953, the United Nations recognized Puerto Rico as a selfgoverning political entity under the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
748.
(7) The political status of Puerto Rico is of significant interest to communities both
on and off the island, including diaspora groups that continue having strong
cultural ties and socioeconomic ties to Puerto Rico.
(8) The United States has a legal duty to comply with Article 1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establishes that all peoples have the
right to self-determination and “by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.
(9) The status convention provides a deliberative, comprehensive, and
uninterrupted space of dialogue that can define the future of Puerto Rico.
Id. § 2.
88. See Rafael Bernal, Top Academics Slam Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, THE
HILL (Apr. 12, 2021, 5:47 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/547790-top-academicsslam-puerto-rico-self-determination-act.
89. Id. The signatories argue that the limited options for Puerto Rico going forward do
not include the kind of convention process proposed in the Self-Determination Act. Id. (“‘The
U.S. Constitution provides three options for Puerto Rico: statehood, territory or
independence. Neither a convention nor act of Congress can change that basic fact. Only a
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A competing statehood bill, the Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act,
was introduced in Congress by Florida Representative Darren Soto and
Puerto Rico Resident Commissioner Jenniffer González-Colón on March
2, 2021. 90 The Bill is described as one that “establishes a process for the
admission of Puerto Rico into the union as a state, on an equal footing
with all other states, based on a majority vote of the people of Puerto
Rico.” 91 If passed, the Act “would require Congress to vote whether to
admit Puerto Rico as a state and on passage order one final plebiscite of
Puerto Rican voters to accept or decline Congress’s offer of statehood.” 92
The academics who wrote to Congress in support of the Puerto Rico
Statehood Admission Act argued that:
In the 123 years since the United States annexed Puerto Rico,
Congress has never offered Puerto Ricans the choice to become a
state. Instead, the United States has allowed Puerto Rico to
languish indefinitely as a U.S. territory, subjecting its residents
to U.S. laws while denying them voting representation in the
government that makes those laws. 93
Despite this, President Biden and leaders in Congress have
continued to be reluctant to take a firm stand in support of Puerto Rican
statehood. 94
Unfortunately, the issue of Puerto Rican statehood not only remains
controversial in the United States Congress—it is a divisive issue in
Puerto Rico itself. When the possibility of statehood for Puerto Rico was
raised in 2020 by a yes-or-no referendum in the territory, more than half
of the Puerto Ricans who voted supported statehood. 95 But, as At-Large

constitutional amendment can do that,’ said Rep. Darren Soto (D-Fla.), who authored a
statehood bill that’s also up for consideration in Congress.”).
90. Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Act, H.R. 1522, 117th Cong. (2021), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1522; Bernal, supra note 88 (“[The] bill
was introduced by Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) in the Senate.”).
91. Congressional Research Service, Summary: H.R. 1522–Puerto Rico Statehood
Admission Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/
1522 (last accessed Jan. 3, 2022).
92. Bernal, supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Id. (“Many Democrats, including [Senate Majority Leader Charles] Schumer
and President Biden, have in the past spoken in favor of statehood, only to backtrack later
as a nod to progressives, who generally support more sovereignty for the island rather than
permanent union with the United States.”).
95. See José Bernardo Márquez, A One-Sided Statehood Bill for Puerto Rico is Anything
but Democratic, NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/onesided-statehood-bill-puerto-rico-anything-democratic-opinion-1603918 (“In a yes-or-no
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Puerto Rican Representative José Bernardo Márquez explains, the issue
of statehood is one that also divides the people of Puerto Rico:
Members of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (NPP),
including Puerto Rico’s governor and resident commissioner (its
non-voting representative in Congress), argue that vote should
settle Puerto Rico’s status dilemma. That’s why they are pushing
for Congress to approve an admission bill that would make
Puerto Rico a state. But the reality is far more complex, as the
recent congressional hearing on Puerto Rico’s status showed.
Their position obscures the failings of the multiple plebiscites
legislated by the NPP in recent years, not one of which has
garnered democratic consensus as a fair and open process for
Puerto Rico’s self-determination . . . As an American, I believe
that equality for Puerto Rico and all the territories makes us a
more perfect Union. Statehood for predominantly brown,
Spanish-speaking Puerto Rico would be a victory for a United
States of America rooted in true democratic constitutionalism,
and not on historically exclusionary racial and cultural politics. 96
Unfortunately, Representative Márquez’s belief that “[s]tatehood for
predominantly brown, Spanish-speaking Puerto Rico would be a victory
for a United States of America” is not shared by a segment of our current
Congress. 97 Although this is a critical moment for Puerto Rican
statehood, the same issues of race, language, and culture remain
obstacles in the twenty-first century. 98 Only time will tell whether
referendum on statehood held last November, 52.5 percent of Puerto Ricans supported
making Puerto Rico a state.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.; Jonathan Chait, The Senate is America’s Most Structurally Racist Institution,
INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 10, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/08/senatewashington-dc-puerto-rico-statehood-filibuster-obama-biden-racist.html (“[I]t is not just
conservatives who believe that states must always be admitted in partisan pairs. Two years
ago, Rhode Island senator Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat, confessed not to care at all
about D.C. statehood: ‘I don’t have a particular interest in that issue. If we got one onehundredth in Rhode Island of what D.C. gets in federal jobs and activity, I’d be thrilled.’
And, he said, while he sympathized with Puerto Rico’s case, he opposed it because it would
help his party. ‘Puerto Rico is actually a better case because they have a big population that
qualifies as U.S. and they are not, as D.C. is, an enclave designed to support the federal
government,’ Whitehouse said. ‘The problem of Puerto Rico is it does throw off the balance
so you get concerns like, who do [Republicans] find, where they can get an offsetting
addition to the states.’” (alteration in original)).
98. See Chait, supra note 97 (“The Senate is affirmative action for white people. If we
had to design political institutions from scratch, nobody—not even Republicans—would be
able to defend a system that massively overrepresented whites. And yet, while we are
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members of Congress will ultimately decide to move beyond the old tropes
of white supremacy concerning territorial statehood from the twentieth
century, or continue to embrace the antiquated and racist colonial ideals
that have kept Puerto Rico and other non-continental territories in the
stranglehold of the United States empire.
III.

“WHITE BY LAW” 99: THE NEW MEXICO AND ARIZONA
TERRITORIES AND THE TERRITORIAL WEST

“It is an extraordinary fact about the United States that its western
territories became states, parts of the union on an equal footing with
older states. But that fact can overshadow the territorial purgatory that
future states occupied for long periods.” 100
In January 1912 and February 1912, respectively, the New Mexico
Territory and the Arizona Territory were admitted to statehood as the
forty-seventh and forty-eighth states in the Union. 101 The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending the war between the United States and
Mexico, was signed on February 2, 1848. 102 As a result of the Treaty,
Mexico ceded the majority of the modern American Southwest, and most
of California, to the United States. 103 The Mexican Cession also included
most of modern-day Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico. 104
Although the New Mexico Territory had been part of the Union since
the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848, the bid for territorial
statehood was long and slow. This was due in large part to the fact that
native Mexicans and American Indians vastly outnumbered the white
settlers in the territory. 105 “Because the Gadsden Treaty and the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed United States citizenship to Mexican
citizens in the acquired territories, all Mexicans who acquired citizenship
as a result of the treaties were considered white under United States law,
yanking old 30 Rock episodes and holding White Fragility struggle sessions in boardrooms,
a massive source of institutionalized racial bias is sitting in plain sight.”).
99. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 10th ed. 2006).
100. Daniel Immerwahr, The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S.
History, 40 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 373, 384 (2016).
101. Territories to Statehood, the Southwest: Topics in Chronicling America, LIBR. OF
CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/chronicling-america-southwest-territories (last visited Jan. 3,
2022).
102. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO AT WAR: NINETEENTH–CENTURY EXPANSIONISM
AND CONFLICT 437 (Donald S. Frazier ed., 1998).
103. See id. at 438.
104. See id.
105. Gómez, supra note 4, at 18–21.
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and could therefore vote in the . . . Territory.” 106 However, the Anglo
settlers in the territory did not view the darker-skinned mestizo
residents of the territory to be white. 107 This led the territory to confront
a troubling question in its quest for statehood: How to get members of
Congress to agree to admit a territory with a large—if not majority 108—
non-white population?
A. New Mexico Territory
It is beyond dispute that the long delay between the end of the
Mexican-American War in 1848 and statehood for New Mexico in 1912
was due to the significant concerns raised by those in Congress about the
territory’s large non-white population. 109 Despite these concerns,
however, the road to statehood for the New Mexico Territory began with
two separate conventions and petitions to Congress in 1856. 110
Substantively, there was no difference between the two petitions. The
conventions were held in Mesilla, New Mexico and Tucson, Arizona,
respectively. 111 The Mesilla convention, like the competing Tucson
convention, petitioned for there to be two separate territories. 112 The only

106. Kristina M. Campbell, Rising Arizona: The Legacy of the Jim Crow Southwest on
Immigration Law and Policy After 100 Years of Statehood, 24 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 6
(2014). Following the Mexican-American War, citizenship was guaranteed by Treaty to
Mexican men. Id. However, whiteness as a requirement for United States citizenship was
first established in the Naturalization Act of 1790. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, §
1, 1790 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). The Act provided that citizenship shall be extended only
to white immigrants. See id. (“[A]ny alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided
within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years,
may be admitted to become a citizen thereof . . . .”). Thus, because of the requirement in the
Naturalization Act that all citizens be white, under the Treaties ending the war MexicanAmerican men became, as Ian Haney López has notably observed, “white by law.” See
LÓPEZ, supra note 99, at 43–44.
107. See Campbell, supra note 106, at 6.
108. See Gómez, supra note 4, at 21.
109. See THOMAS E. SHERIDAN, ARIZONA: A HISTORY 181 (Joseph C. Wilder ed., rev. ed.
2012) (“[O]pponents [for statehood] argued that neither ‘the desert sands of Arizona’ nor
‘the humble Spanish-speaking people of New Mexico’ were ready for statehood.”).
110. See Johnny D. Boggs, The Road to Statehood, Southwest Style, HISTORYNET, https:/
/www.historynet.com/road-statehood-southwest-style.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) (“In
the summer of 1856 William Claude Jones, U.S. attorney for New Mexico Territory, called
a meeting in Mesilla (near present-day Las Cruces) at which he and 57 others signed a
petition to Congress that the territory—which encompassed all of present-day Arizona and
New Mexico—be divided into two territories by a boundary running eastwest [sic] along the
34th parallel. Not to be outdone, Tucson in August 1856 held its own meeting, at which 260
signatories requested the territory be divided.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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real difference was that the Tucson petition called for the second,
separate state, to tentatively be called Arizona. 113
Congress established the New Mexico Territory on September 9,
1850. 114 At its largest, the New Mexico Territory was very large,
comprising approximately 235,000 square miles. 115 The grand scope of
the territory, as well as the continued Spanish colonial influence of what
was formerly Mexico, 116 colored the opinion of those in Congress who
were concerned about the influence of the non-Anglo population. Tomas
Jaehn of the Fray Angélico Chávez History Library in Santa Fe opines:
“It took New Mexico 62 years to become a state, and the most
prominent stumbling block was, in my opinion, race and
language” . . . “Congress tried several times to limit the enabling
act language to ‘English only,’ and it took key congressional
officials like Antonio Joseph [in the late 19th century] and, later,
A.A. Jones and some ‘maneuvering’ via the constitution draft to
get around this language limitation. Eventually, the U.S. House
Committee on the Territories dropped the ‘English only’ verbiage,
and Spanish language and Hispanic culture had its proper place
in the state of New Mexico.” 117
The main controversy facing New Mexico on its road to statehood was
whether it should be joined with Arizona when seeking admission to the
Union as a state. The goal of those in Congress who were in favor of
admitting the New Mexico and Arizona Territories as one state—known
as “jointure”—was to limit the number of senators from the western part
of the United States:
In the early 1900s Congress considered bringing in four new
states—Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Indian Territory—
113. Id. (“Charles Debrille Poston, a Kentucky-born miner based in Tubac, proposed
naming the new territory Arizona.”).
114. See Andrew Glass, New Mexico and Utah Organized as Incorporated U.S.
Territories, Sept. 9, 1850, POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2015, 8:14 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2015/09/this-day-in-politics-sept-9-1850-213308#:~:text=Twitter-,New%20Mexico%
20and%20Utah%20organized%20as%20incorporated%20U.S.%20territories%2C%20Sept,
9%2C%201850.
115. Boggs, supra note 110 (“[New Mexico Territory] include[ed] parts of present-day
Colorado and Nevada. Tucson and Yuma were some 500 and 700 miles, respectively, from
the territorial capital in Santa Fe.”).
116. See id. (“Despite New Mexico’s status as an American territory, much of it remained
Mexican. A Mexican garrison remained in Tucson until 1856—two years after ratification
of the Gadsden Purchase. Even as Mexican troops filed out of town that March, Virginian
Bill Kirkland led a party to unfurl the U.S. flag atop Edward Miles’ mercantile.”).
117. Id.
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but then decided “jointure” to be a better option, with a better
chance of passing, “the political goal,” Mark B. Thompson writes,
“being a limitation on the number of U.S. senators representing
the wide open spaces of the American West.” Oklahoma Territory
and Indian Territory, which had been divided into two territories
in 1890, would join and enter the Union as one state (which
happened in 1907 when Oklahoma became the 46th state). Under
the plan Arizona and New Mexico would also rejoin in an attempt
to secure state status. 118
In November 1906, “New Mexicans voted 26,195–14,735 for jointure,
but Arizonans rejected the measure, 16,265–3,141.” 119 With jointure off
the table, both the New Mexico and Arizona Territories held
constitutional conventions again in 1910. 120 In both constitutional
conventions, the issues of race and civil rights became of paramount
importance:
Thirty-five of New Mexico’s 100 delegates to the constitutional
convention were Hispanic. They made certain the constitution
protected citizens’ right to vote regardless of “religion, race,
language or color.” It further ensured that Hispanic children
could not be denied public-school education and would “enjoy
perfect equality with other children in all public schools.”
Although some wanted additional measures—voting rights for
women in all elections (not just school elections) and less
protection for special-interest groups—on January 21, 1911, New
Mexicans ratified the constitution, 31,742–13,399. 121
After Arizona ratified its constitution in February 1911, Congress
passed a joint resolution admitting New Mexico and Arizona as states in
August 1911, and New Mexico became the forty-seventh state in the
Union on January 6, 1912. 122 However, a full understanding of New
Mexico’s struggle to achieve statehood requires a closer look at the issues
of white supremacy boiling under the surface from the beginning.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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1. Whiteness as a De Facto Requirement for Territorial Statehood
in the West
The quest for statehood was generally not a short or easy one for the
United States territories. 123 But the length of time it took New Mexico to
achieve statehood—62 years—was an exceptional length of time, even in
comparison to other western territories. 124 The reason it took New
Mexico so long to achieve statehood seems to be obvious when it is
compared to other majority-white territories that quickly gained
statehood—the white supremacist attitude of Congress regarding full
membership in our Union for non-white peoples prevented territories
with substantial non-white populations, like New Mexico, from achieving
statehood until a majority-white population could be achieved. 125
Thus, it should not be surprising that historians have determined
that a primary reason for this delay was the “multi-lingual and multicultural” nature of the New Mexico Territory:
Why . . . did Congress not admit New Mexico as a state sooner?
Many historians have identified racism as a key factor in the
delay. In 1848 when the Mexican North was ceded to the United
States, New Mexico contained the highest Mexican population in
the whole region. Because the population grew slowly in the
state, it maintained a majority of Hispano and Native American
residents into the twentieth century. The territorial government
was designed to handle this multi-lingual and multi-cultural
reality. The legal system, for example, provided Spanish
interpreters and published all laws in both English and Spanish.
Members of Congress and the American population at large
worried that such a “foreign” people would not make good
American citizens. 126

123. See Kathleen Ferris, Racism as An Impediment to Statehood, UNM DIGITAL
REPOSITORY
(Sept.
9,
2011),
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=nmstatehood2 (“[C]onsider the length of territorial
status for . . . states in the West: Colorado-15 years, Nevada-14 years, Utah-46 years,
Montana-25 years, Wyoming-22 years, Idaho-44 years.”).
124. Id. (“New Mexico spent an unusually long period as a territory, 62 years in total.”);
see also Immerwahr, supra note 100, at 384 (“On average, places that began as territories
on the continent took forty-five years to achieve statehood.” ).
125. Cf. Immerwahr, supra note 100, at 384 (“Passage to statehood did come quickly in
some cases, such as gold-rush California. California filled with whites and transitioned
from military rule to statehood in two years.”).
126. Ferris, supra note 123.
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The concern that the citizens of the New Mexico Territory were too
“foreign”—even though those that were born in the territory were United
States citizens at birth 127 —demonstrates the implicit, and sometimes
explicit, culture of white supremacy concerning the admission of new
states to the Union. 128 Indeed, when considered along with other nonmajority white territories whose bid for statehood languished for
years, 129 it is hard not to conclude that whiteness was—and, I argue, still
is—a de facto requirement for statehood.
a. Indian Territory, White Settler Colonialists, and Oklahoma
Statehood
Like New Mexico, Oklahoma is another western territory that faced
a long road to statehood because of its majority non-white population. 130
Yet the reasons for Oklahoma’s struggle to achieve statehood, while also
grounded in a white supremacist philosophy of citizenship, is unique
because of its status as Indian land. As scholar David Immerwahr
explains:
The reason for Oklahoma’s long period of territorial subjugation
is that, for the majority of the nineteenth century, it wasn’t
Oklahoma but “Indian Territory,” a legally defined but
unorganized all-Indian territory within the United States. At its
establishment in 1834, Indian Territory extended from the top of
present-day Texas to the Canadian border and from the
Mississippi to the Rockies. The Jackson administration proposed
carving out a large portion of Indian Territory for eventual
admission to the union as an all-Indian state. Congress rejected
the proposal, though, partly to avoid the prospect of Indian
representatives in the Capitol. With time, Indian Territory was
whittled down to Oklahoma. After thousands of whites poured

127. Id.
128. See id. (“In our time, we see this reluctance to admit New Mexico as a state based
on the language and culture of some of its residents as blatant discrimination. Nonetheless,
it was a real problem for those who wished to make New Mexico a state. Some New Mexico
politicians thought placing restrictions on the citizenship and voting rights of Hispanos and
Native Americans was the best way to curry political favor and achieve statehood.”).
129. See Immerwahr, supra note 100, at 384–85 (“Oklahoma . . . languished as a
territory for 104 years between annexation and statehood” until it finally gained statehood
in 1907.).
130. Id.
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into the territory, many in breach of federal law, it was
eventually admitted as a white-majority state in 1907. 131
The history of how Oklahoma became a majority-white territory
sufficient to satisfy the xenophobic concerns of Congress is a particularly
complicated and brutal one. In 1887, the Dawes General Allotment Act
(“Dawes Act”) 132 stripped the indigenous people of Oklahoma of their
land so that it could be settled by white colonists. 133 The Dawes Act
“authorized the government to break up the tribal lands and allot them
to individual Native Americans in parcels of 40, 80, and 160 acres. Only
Native Americans who accepted the land could become U.S. citizens and
any remaining land would be made available for public sale.” 134
In the 1880s, the United States government began implementing a
policy called allotment, which was “a system designed to force Native
assimilation into white culture by dividing their traditional communal
lands overseen by tribal governments into small, individually owned
properties.” 135
Even prior to the allotment system, the government began moving
tribes within the Indian Territory to make way for white settlers to
occupy their land:
During the time of Andrew Jackson, the government moved the
Five Tribes to Indian Territory along with scores of other tribes.
After the 1866 Reconstruction Treaties with the Five Tribes,
federal negotiators set up reservations in the western part of the
Territory for southern plains tribes and reserved the central
part—the “unassigned lands”—for tribes in Kansas and tribes to
be relocated in the future. Ultimately, something like 67 tribes
131. Id. It appears that this reference to white settlers who came to Oklahoma “in breach
of federal law” refers to the activities of the so-called “Sooners,” white settlers who squatted
on Indian land during the Oklahoma Land Rush of 1889. See Jenny Ashcraft, Boomers and
Sooners: The Oklahoma Land Rush of 1889, NEWSPAPERS.COM: FISHWRAP (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://blog.newspapers.com/boomers-and-sooners-the-oklahoma-land-rush-of-1889/.
132. See Dawes General Allotment Act, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dawes-General-Allotment-Act.
133. Ashcraft, supra note 131.
134. Id.
135. Erin Blakemore, Sequoyah, the U.S. State that Almost Existed, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/sequoyah-americanstate-almost-existed [hereinafter Sequoyah, the U.S. State that Almost Existed] (“White
settlers . . . sought to take over the area they called the Unassigned Lands, a two-millionacre swath of central Oklahoma the U.S. had forced the Muscogee and Seminoles—who
had sided with the Confederacy during the Civil War—to cedemore [sic] than a decade
earlier. Would-be settlers known as the Boomers squatted on the land and, after years of
lobbying, the federal government agreed to open it to white settlement in 1889.”).
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inhabited the Territory. Not all of the land was allocated,
however. The federal government cleared title for mostly
unoccupied lands in the center of the state and this is the land
that the government opened for settlement in 1889 with the first
land run. 136
White settler colonialists then began coming to Oklahoma and
occupying the so-called “Unassigned Lands:” 137
In 1889, as many as 50 thousand settlers poured into Oklahoma
hoping to stake claim to a portion of nearly two million acres
opened for settlement by the U.S. Government. Many had
campaigned the federal government to open the land for
settlement and were known as Boomers. The land, formerly
occupied by Native Americans, was considered Unassigned
Lands after the federal government forcibly relocated many
Native American tribes. On April 22, 1889, at noon sharp, a bugle
sounded, and hopeful settlers surged across the territory line.
The number of settlers surpassed available land and they soon
realized that some snuck into Oklahoma ahead of the April
22nd open date. This gave them a leg up on the law-abiding
settlers and first in line for the most desirable land. Those early
homestead seekers were known as Sooners. 138
In 1890, the Oklahoma Territory was created from the Unassigned
Lands and other western parts of the Indian Territory. 139 Once the
white settler population was greater than the native Indian population,
Congress passed the Curtis Act in 1898, abolishing the territory’s
sovereign tribal governments and paving the way for Oklahoma
statehood. 140 Finally, Congress passed the Oklahoma Enabling Act in
1906 141 and Oklahoma was admitted to statehood on November 16,
136. Mack Burke, Examining the Origin of ‘Boomer Sooner’, NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (May
7, 2016), https://www.normantranscript.com/news/examining-the-origin-of-boomer-sooner/
article_ee627ccf-ae4c-5894-84f6-823073e47ab2.html.
137. See Sequoyah, the U.S. State that Almost Existed, supra note 135.
138. See Ashcraft, supra note 131.
139. See id.; see also Oklahoma Organic Act, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
140. See M. Kaye Tatro, Curtis Act (1898), OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.okhistory.org/
publications/enc/entry.php?entry=CU006 (last visited Jan. 3, 2022); Paul Frymer, The
Politics of D.C. Statehood Follow a Well-Worn Path. Here’s Why, WASH. POST (July 6, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/06/politics-dc-statehood-follow-wellworn-path-heres-why/.
141. Dianna Everett, Enabling
Act (1906), OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, https://
www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=EN001 (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
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1907. 142 Once again, the culture of white supremacy had played a key
role in the fate of territorial statehood—a philosophy that continued in
the admission of the subsequent territories seeking statehood.
B. Arizona Territory
Arizona achieved independent territorial status in 1863. 143 Professor
Paul Frymer has reflected on the role of race in the admission of the
Arizona and New Mexico Territories to statehood in the early twentieth
century:
The conversation in Congress was, “Was the state white? Was
there a majority white population? Was there a large enough
white population that spoke English?” All of these types of
terminology were applied to what was largely an indigenous and
formerly Mexican population. 144
It is not generally well known outside of the historical scholarship
community that the Arizona Territory was part of the Confederate States
of America for a time. 145 Thus, before achieving independent territorial
status in the United States in 1863, the Confederate Territory of Arizona
was declared during the Civil War on August 1, 1861. 146
The Confederate Territory of Arizona was created in August 1861
after the proposal to establish the Arizona Territory also called for
cessation from the Union. 147 After the Confederate Army won the Battle
of Mesilla in July 1861, Confederate troops occupied Tucson, and on
142. Sequoyah, the U.S. State that Almost Existed, supra note 135 (“Congress passed
the Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906. This new law settled the debate over statehood by
inviting representatives to write a state constitution, choose a capital, and move forward
with a state that combined both Oklahoma and Indian Territories. On November 16,
1907, Oklahoma became the nation’s 46th state.”).
143. Andrew Glass, Arizona Organized as a Separate Territory: Feb. 24, 1863, POLITICO
(Feb. 24, 2016, 12:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/arizona-organized-asseparate-territory-feb-24-1863-219596.
144. Barbara Sprunt, Simmering Disputes Over Statehood Are About Politics and Race.
They Always Have Been, NPR (Aug. 21, 2020, 4:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/21/
902334807/simmering-disputes-over-statehood-are-about-politics-and-race-they-alwayshave-b.
145. See The American Civil War in Texas: A Sesquicentennial Timeline, TEX. STATE
LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/lobbyexhibits/civil-war-timeline (May
20, 2016).
146. Id. (“August 1, 1861 – Confederate forces having seized control of most federal forts
in the Arizona Territory, John R. Baylor declares himself governor of the territory, but
fighting continues.”).
147. See WILLIAM S. KISER, TURMOIL ON THE RIO GRANDE: HISTORY OF THE MESILLA
VALLEY, 1846–1865, at 176–77 (2011).
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February 14, 1862, Confederate President Jefferson Davis formally
recognized the Confederate Territory of Arizona by proclamation. 148
However, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Organic Act into law on
February 24, 1863, which created the free—non-slave—Arizona Territory
of the United States, with Tucson as its capital. 149
Following the reclamation of the Arizona Territory by the United
States from the Confederacy, 150 efforts turned quickly toward the goal of
statehood. However, like other United States territories, the majority of
the population of Arizona in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was non-white. 151 Although all Mexican men living in the
Arizona Territory who acquired citizenship after the end of the MexicanAmerican War were legally considered “White men,” 152 white settlers in
the Arizona Territory did not view the mestizo and Indian natives of the
territory as “white.” 153 This led to a protracted battle with opposing
goals—to limit the civil rights of non-white citizens living in the Arizona
Territory while also somehow managing to convince the United States
Congress that the majority of the territorial population was white. 154
Professor Thomas Sheridan has described this battle for statehood as
one that “shape[d] the kind of state Arizona would inevitably become.” 155
Like other United States territories striving for statehood, race and
language were once again sticking points for the white settlers in the
Arizona Territory and members of the United States Congress. White
settlers claimed that Spanish-speaking citizens were a threat to the
prosperity of the Arizona Territory because their lack of English
endangered the safety of workers in the territory. 156 However, as
148. See B. Sacks, The Creation of the Territory of Arizona, 5 J. SW. 109, 115–18 (1963).
149. Campbell, supra note 106, at 5; see also ANDREW E. MASICH, THE CIVIL WAR IN
ARIZONA: THE STORY OF THE CALIFORNIA VOLUNTEERS, 1861–1865, at 261 (2006).
150. See Campbell, supra note 106, at 5 (“[D]espite the reclamation of the Arizona
Territory by the Union, the territory continued to be represented in the Confederate
Congress until the end of the Civil War in 1865.”).
151. Id. at 5–6.
152. See id. at 6 (“Because the Gadsden Treaty and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
guaranteed United States citizenship to Mexican citizens in the acquired territories, all
Mexicans who acquired citizenship as a result of the treaties were considered White under
United States law . . . .”).
153. See KATHERINE BENTON-COHEN, BORDERLINE AMERICANS: RACIAL DIVISION AND
LABOR WAR IN THE ARIZONA BORDERLANDS 30 (2009).
154. See Campbell, supra note 106, at 6–7, 12 (“[L]egislatures with significant MexicanAmerican populations began to interpret their laws in such a way that only provided “White
Mexicans” constitutional rights, thus prohibiting Mexicans of Indian and African descent
(who were commonly called mestizos or mulattoes) from voting, holding public office,
practicing law, testifying in court cases involving Whites, or serving on juries.”).
155. See SHERIDAN, supra note 109, at 181.
156. Id. at 183.
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Professor Sheridan notes, this claim was “a racist assumption with no
basis” in reality. 157 Nonetheless, these “racist assumption[s]” about the
non-white citizens had a detrimental impact on the aspirations of the
Arizona Territory and would continue throughout the territorial quest
for statehood.
When the Arizona Territory was first presented to Congress for
potential statehood in 1902—along with New Mexico and Oklahoma—it
was derided as “a mining camp” that was “too sparsely populated to be
granted statehood independently.” 158 The leader of the Senate
Committee on Territories, Republican Senator Albert Beveridge of
Indiana, was opposed to statehood for the Arizona Territory because of
its lack of a majority-white population. 159 In 1909, in an effort to suppress
the suffrage of the territory’s non-white population, the territorial
legislature “passed a law that prohibited the voter registration of
individuals who could not read a portion of the United States
Constitution and write his name.” 160 Nonetheless, statehood for the
Arizona Territory remained out of reach, its white settlers unable for the
time being to satisfy the members of the Congress that its citizenry was
sufficiently white.
If there was any doubt as to what was required for Arizona to be
granted statehood, the progress that the New Mexico Territory was
making based on the increase in its white population put that to rest in
1912 when “[a]s one advocate of statehood [in Congress] put it:
‘Americans are coming in there by the thousands every year. The entire
increase of population … is what we would call Americans. There is no
increase by immigration among the Mexicans.’” 161
When Arizona finally became the forty-eighth state on February 14,
1912, 162 in many ways its long, complicated, and conflicted relationship
with race, culture, and membership was just beginning. In the end, the
lessons that can be learned from the Arizona Territory’s fraught path to
157. Id.
158. Keridwen Cornelius, Arizona’s Path to Statehood, AZCENTRAL (Apr. 11, 2015, 9:18
AM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/travel/local/history/2015/04/11/arizona-path-state
hood/25486399/.
159. Id.; see Frymer, supra note 140 (“Sen. Albert Beveridge (R-Ind.), the head of the
Senate Committee on Territories, consistently opposed [New Mexico] statehood because the
territory lacked a white majority.”).
160. Campbell, supra note 106, at 18.
161. Frymer, supra note 140.
162. See Scott Craven, How Phoenix Celebrated Arizona’s Statehood in 1912, AZCENTRAL
(Feb. 12, 2016, 7:21 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2016/02/12/
how-phoenix-celebrated-arizonas-statehood-1912/80191944/ (“On Wednesday, Feb. 14,
1912, Phoenix residents awoke to a banner headline in The Arizona Republican: ‘The 48th
State Steps Into the Union Today.’”).
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statehood are reminiscent of both previous and continuing struggles to
define what makes a people “American” enough to be granted full
citizenship and all its accordant rights and privileges. And, as we would
later see with the subsequent admissions of Alaska and Hawai’i as the
forty-ninth and fiftieth states in 1959, 163 while the issues of race and
culture that were paramount in the statehood journey of Arizona have
not waned, other strategic considerations ultimately trumped legislative
concerns about maintaining majority-white populations in the several
states during the Cold War. 164
IV. THE STRATEGIC EXCEPTION: HAWAI’I
“For many of Hawaii’s non-white peoples, especially those of
Japanese descent who had borne the brunt of hostility and suspicion,
statehood was much more than a guarantee of unqualified political
rights: by the 1940s it had become an emotive symbol of genuine
acceptance into the wider American society.” 165
In many ways, Hawai’i’s ascension to statehood should not have been
surprising—after all, Hawai’i had been a territory of the United States
since 1898. 166 The Kingdom of Hawaii had been annexed when white
settler colonialists from the United States overthrew the Hawaiian
monarchy in 1893, 167 despite the native Hawaiian population’s failed
opposition to the annexation. 168 Settler colonialism in Hawai’i began in
the 1820s, when Christian missionaries arrived and began imposing
their religion and culture on the native Hawaiian population. 169
163. The Last Time Congress Created a New State, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-last-time-congress-created-a-new-state-hawaii (“In
January 1959, Alaska became the 49th state, which accelerated the Hawaii statehood
process. On March 11, 1959: the Senate voted 75-15 in favor of the Admissions Act, with
the House approving the same bill in a 323 to 89 vote on March 12, 1959.”).
164. See supra Part IV.
165. See BELL, supra note 11, at xii.
166. See Annexation of Hawaii, 1898, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2001-2009.state.gov
/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17661.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
167. See BELL, supra note 11, at ix.
168. See NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO
AMERICAN COLONIALISM 123–25 (2004).
169. See Alice Kim, Christian Missionaries in Hawaii, HAW. DIGIT. NEWSPAPER
PROJECT,
https://sites.google.com/a/hawaii.edu/ndnp-hawaii/Home/historical-featurearticles/christian-missionaries-in-hawaii (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) (“On March 30, 1820,
Hawaii would witness the dawn of Christianity and the most influential religious group in
Hawaii. After 164 days of traveling through the United States and sailing through the
Pacific Ocean in the Thaddeus, fourteen missionaries (seven mission couples) would arrive
in Hawaii, landing at Kawaihae and Kailua-Kona, Big Island. . . . In Hawaii, the
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The Organic Act passed by Congress in 1900 granted Hawai’i the
legal right to eventual statehood, 170 and the first bill for Hawaiian
statehood was introduced in Congress in 1920. 171 After World War II, a
great deal of the population of Hawai’i was in favor of statehood 172:
[S]upport for statehood was increasingly synonymous with
enthusiasm for truly representative government . . . . Supported
largely by the descendants of Asian immigrants, who had long
been denied equality in island life, the Democrats fervently
believed that equality as a state in the Union would pave the way
for genuine democracy and equality of opportunity at home. 173
However, the deep anti-Asian sentiment in the United States in the
nineteenth century, along with the large Japanese population in Hawai’i,
complicated Hawai’i’s bid for statehood in Congress after World War
II. 174 These complications ultimately led to the creation of the Hawai’i
Statehood Commission in 1947, which proponents of Hawaii’s admission
to the Union hoped would curb the racist and xenophobic arguments
against Hawaiian statehood gathering strength in Congress. 175

A. The Hawai’i Statehood Commission and Anti-Asian Sentiment,

missionaries converted Hawaiian people to the Christian faith, developed the written form
of Hawaiian, discouraged many Hawaiian cultural practices, introduced their Western
practices, and encouraged the spread of English. One of the most powerful converts, Queen
Kaahumanu, embraced Christianity, imposed it to the rest of the kingdom, and banned
Hawaiian religious practices.”).
170. See Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (1900).
171. See HAW. STATEHOOD COMM’N, HAWAII STATE ARCHIVES 1 (1947–59).
172. See BELL, supra note 11, at xiii (“[A] plebiscite indicated that more than two-thirds
of Hawaii’s electorate favored statehood.”).
173. Id. at xii.
174. See Eleanor C. Nordyke & Y. Scott Matsumoto, The Japanese in Hawaii: A
Historical and Demographic Perspective, 11 HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 162, 168 (1977); see BELL,
supra note 11, at x, xii–xiv (“Until 1959, when it was belatedly accepted as a state, Hawaii
remained a semi-colonial appendage of the United States.”).
175. See HAW. STATEHOOD COMM’N, supra note 171, at 1; see infra Part IV.A.
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1947-1959
As early as 1937, the fact that most of Hawai’i’s population was nonwhite was a stumbling block for ratification of statehood in Congress. 176
This opposition led to the passage of Act 115, S.L.H. 1947, which
“authorized the establishment of the Hawaii Statehood Commission to
‘actively support and press the movement for statehood.’” 177 While the
Statehood Commission was tasked with the goal of gaining statehood for
Hawai’i, it was also from the outset given the responsibility of “protecting
against discriminatory legislation, preventing discrimination against
American citizens of the Territory, correcting false information, and
promoting the genral [sic] interest and welfare of the Territory of
Hawaii.” 178
The “discrimination” and “false information” that the Hawaii
Statehood Commission needed to combat was the anti-Asian sentiment
brewing in Congress in opposition to Hawai’i’s bid for statehood. 179 From
the very beginning, race was the primary obstacle to getting
Congressional approval for Hawai’i statehood:
Hawaii presented Congress with an unprecedented dilemma: it
raised unavoidably the question of equality under the nation’s
Constitution for a noncontiguous area with an essentially
nonwhite population. . . . Hawaii’s status within the Union, as
well as its unique racial composition and ambiguous
Americanization, provoked deep controversy, even hostility, in
Washington. In particular, its diverse ethnic composition and
tolerant social practices challenged the patterns of race relations
imposed in many mainland states, notably those still
segregated. 180

176. See Sarah Miller Davenport, Racists in Congress Fought Statehood for Hawaii, but
Lost that Battle 60 Years Ago, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 18, 2019, 6:45 AM), https://
theconversation.com/racists-in-congress-fought-statehood-for-hawaii-but-lost-that-battle60-years-ago-113499 (“By 1937, however, the statehood campaign had stalled on the back
of a congressional investigation that called into question the loyalty of the islands’ Japanese
population, Hawaii’s largest ethnic group. According to one statehood opponent, the very
idea of statehood was ‘preposterous,’ since people of Japanese descent in Hawaii held
allegiance to Japan, ‘which they could not disavow if they would, and would not if they
could.’”).
177. See HAW. STATEHOOD COMM’N, supra note 171, at 1.
178. Id.
179. Id.; Davenport, supra note 176.
180. See BELL, supra note 11, at xiii–xiv.
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President Truman’s Civil Rights Commission of 1946 played a large
role in the creation of the Hawaii Statehood Commission. 181 It was this
connection to the larger American Civil Rights Movement that helped
Hawai’i ultimately gain enough support in Congress to be the only state
admitted to the Union with an undisputed non-white majority citizenry
in 1959. 182
B. Hawaiian Statehood as a Civil Rights Issue
The struggles of Hawai’i to gain statehood are inextricably related to
racial equality and the larger Civil Rights Movement of the twentieth
century in the United States. 183 Much like Jim Crow, the roots of the
opposition to Hawai’i statehood came from the segregated South. 184 The
white supremacist attitude of Southern Senators opposed to Hawaiian
statehood is exemplified in the comment of Florida Senator George
Smathers, who argued that statehood for Hawai’i “threatened ‘our high
standard of living’ and ‘the purity of our democracy.’” 185 As Texas
Representative W.R. Poage stated, the main reason for Southern
opposition to Hawai’i statehood was the balance of racial political power:

181. See Bell, supra note 3, at 49. (“Truman appointed a special Civil Rights Commission
in 1946. It subsequently recommended that Congress enact substantive civil rights
legislation to ensure the equal political rights of minorities . . . . Implementation of this
comprehensive civil rights program, Truman emphasised [sic], demanded not only the
granting of full citizenship rights to minority groups in existing states, but immediate
statehood for Hawaii. Statehood was essential if all United States citizens were to enjoy
full and equal civil rights.”).
182. See id. at 46–47, 49 (“[E]ven if Truman had not explicitly classified statehood for
Hawaii as an aspect of his civil rights program, the two issues would nonetheless have
become fused when considered by Congress. Indeed, the developing relationship between
the issues was evidenced during Congressional debate on Hawaii prior to Truman’s call for
passage of comprehensive civil rights legislation in 1948.”); Statehood for Hawaii: Hearing
on S. 49, S. 51, and H.R. 3575 Before the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affs., 83d Cong.
402 (1954) (statement of Rep. Howard W. Smith).
183. See BELL, supra note 11, at xiii (“An understanding of Hawaii’s long-frustrated bid
for statehood demands an appreciation of the ways in which it impinged on wider national
controversies. These disputes determined its fate in Congress, especially during the war
against Japan, the cold war, and the drive for desegregation and civil rights during the
1940s and 1950s.”).
184. See Davenport, supra note 176 (“The base of opposition to statehood in Congress
was Southern Democrats. To them, Hawaii was a dangerous portent of an interracial
future.”).
185. Id. In opposition to Hawai’i statehood, Senator Smathers also commented: “Perhaps
we should become the United States of the Pacific, and finally should become the United
States of the Orient . . . .” Id.
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“[T]he proposal for Hawaii statehood might result in ‘two more votes in
the Senate’ for civil rights.” 186
As historian Roger Bell has explained, Southern Democrats for whom
racial segregation was a way of life saw Hawaiian statehood as a threat
to that:
[A] majority of Southern Congressmen interpreted Hawaiian
statehood as a factor which might irrevocably reduce the right of
Southern states to determine domestic racial policies and
practice by adding voting strength to the growing “liberal”, antisegregationist bloc in the Senate. Thus, to a majority of
Southerners, Hawaii statehood constituted a direct threat to
their sectional interests. 187
Southern Democrats did not shy away from expressing their anti-Asian
sentiment when talking about why Hawai’i should not be granted
statehood. Georgia Congressman Prince Hulon Preston, Jr. argued that
Hawaiian residents of Japanese descent, in particular, were unworthy of
full membership in the United States on account of their race:
[W]hat does [the Hawaii bill] do? It makes citizens with equal
rights with you and me of 180,000 Japanese people who reside in
Hawaii. It gives those people the same rights you and I have, we,
the descendants of those who created, fought, and maintained
this country. . . . When you give those people the same rights we
have today you will have [two] Senators speaking for those
180,000 Japanese . . . .” 188
The white supremacist ideology of Virginia Congressman Howard W.
Smith was even more explicit as a reason for his opposition to Hawaiian
statehood. In 1954, while testifying in the Statehood for Hawaii Hearings
in the United States Senate, Representative Smith stated:
I know it is considered very bad form to mention race, and one is
considered out of date and old-fashioned if he has any ideas that
this country is still America for Americans and is the country
built by the Caucasian race. . . . We have never had a State

186. Id.; see also Bell, supra note 3, at 51 (“[A] Texas newspaper argued that statehood
would ‘give Hawaii the right to exercise two Senators worth of self-determination on the
South.’”).
187. Bell, supra note 3, at 51.
188. 93 CONG. REC. 7937 (1947).
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It is in this turbulent environment that Hawai’i’s statehood
ambitions were considered by the United States Congress. And while
Hawai’i was not the first United States territory with a majority nonwhite population to seek statehood, 190 the concurrent issues of the day
served as an obstacle to Hawaiian statehood. Conflict over “minority
rights in wartime, states’ rights . . . racial equality, and relative party
strengths in Congress” were major civil rights issues that distracted
from, and deterred, the success of Hawai’i’s statehood campaign. 191
Ultimately, “[s]tatehood [for Hawaii] was withheld until it was finally
extricated from these deep national conflicts” 192 —including antistatehood campaigns from within Hawai’i itself.
C. Hawaiians Against Statehood: Campbell v. Stainback
In 1946, Territorial Senator Alice Kamokila Campbell, daughter of
nobility of the Kingdom of Hawaii, testified “against statehood given
before a visiting Congressional committee chaired by Representative
Henry Larcade of Louisiana.” 193 The United States House Committee on
Territories conducted hearings for Hawai’i statehood from January 7 to
January 17, 1946, where Senator Campbell spoke in opposition to
Hawaiian statehood. 194 The following year, in September 1947, Senator
Campbell founded the Anti-Statehood Clearing House, which worked to
189. Statehood for Hawaii: Hearing on S. 49, S. 51, and H.R. 3575, supra note 182
(statement of Rep. Howard W. Smith). Additionally, Congressman Smith later argued that
if Hawai’i was admitted as a state, “the vote of one Chinaman in Hawaii would be worth as
much as votes of 31 citizens of New York when it comes to electing Senators.” Hawaiian
Statehood, CQ ALMANAC, https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal531368798 (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
190. See supra Part III.
191. BELL, supra note 11, at xiii.
192. Id.
193. John S. Whitehead, The Anti-Statehood Movement and the Legacy of Alice Kamokila
Campbell, 27 HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 43, 48 (1993). “Mrs. Campbell served in the territorial
Senate as the Democratic senator for Maui-Moloka’i from 1942 to 1946.” Id. Kamokila
Campbell’s mother, Abigail Kuaihealani Maipinepine Campbell, descended from the
Kalanikini line of Maui chieftains. See id. at 47; Kapiikauinamoku, Lunalilo’s Dynasty Is
Represented by Amalus, in THE STORY OF MAUI ROYALTY 105, 105 (1956).
194. Statehood:
Timeline,
HAW.
DIGIT.
NEWSPAPER
PROJECT,
https://
hdnpblog.wordpress.com/historical-articles/statehood/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) (“On the
last day [of the hearings], Territorial Senator Alice Kamokila Campbell spoke against
statehood fifty-three years after the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. In her speech,
she said, ‘I do not feel … we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of the natives
of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in Congress . . . .’”).
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prevent the efforts of the Hawaii Statehood Commission from
succeeding. 195
On January 7, 1948, President Harry S. Truman advocated statehood
for Hawai’i in his State of the Union Address. 196 Following President
Truman’s promotion of Hawai’i statehood, Senator Campbell filed a
lawsuit, Campbell v. Stainback, on January 17, 1948. 197 The lawsuit
argued against the illegalities of the territorial government’s use of
public monies to campaign for statehood, and ultimately reached the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai’i in 1949. 198 Senator Campbell
“questioned the territorial government’s use of $200,000 in public funds
for the local and national campaign for statehood” and argued that the
public funding was being used for “political, rather than for public,
purposes.” 199 Additionally, Senator Campbell decided to strategically file
the lawsuit “to coincide with . . . the fifty-fifth anniversary of the
overthrow of the Hawaiian nation.” 200
The main question considered by the Supreme Court of the Territory
of Hawai’i in Campbell v. Stainback was whether the $200,000 spent
under the authority of Act 115 establishing the Hawaii Statehood
Commission was “to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and
taxpayers” opposed to statehood. 201 As scholar Dean Itsuji Saranillio
explains:
[Senator Campbell’s] suit targeted especially the commission’s
publicity campaign on three main points: “(1) A national or
sectional advertising and publicity campaign is not a valid public
purpose for which public funds may be expended; (2) lobbying in
Washington, D.C., is not a valid public purpose for which public
funds may be expended; (3) the grant of unlimited discretion to

195. Id.
196. President Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address (Jan. 7, 1948) (transcript
available online at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/harry-s-truman/state-of-the-union1948.php) (“We should also consider our obligation to assure the fullest possible measure of
civil rights to the people of our territories and possessions. I believe that the time has come
for Alaska and Hawaii to be admitted to the Union as States.”).
197. 38 Haw. 310 (1949); see A Woman Ahead of Her Time, HAWAIIAN PATRIOTS PROJECT,
https://www.kamakakoi.com/hawaiianpatriots/kamokila.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
198. Campbell, 38 Haw. at 310–11.
199. Statehood: Timeline, supra note 194.
200. DEAN ITSUJI SARANILLIO, UNSUSTAINABLE EMPIRE: ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES OF
HAWAI’I STATEHOOD 123 (2018).
201. Id. (quoting Campbell, 38 Haw. at 311).
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an administrative agency in the expenditure of public funds
constitutes an invalid delegation of power by the legislature.” 202
The remedy sought by Senator Campbell for these claims was an
“injunction to restrain the governor, the attorney general, treasurer and
auditor of the Territory and the chairman and members of the Hawaii
Statehood Commission from expending public moneys under the
provisions of Act 115.” 203
On March 28, 1949, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai’i
issued a unanimous decision in Senator Campbell’s favor. 204 Writing for
the court, Justice Emil C. Peters issued an injunction against the
Statehood Commission, stating that:
The appellees justify the expenditure of public moneys for
publicity purposes . . . upon the ground that the purposes thereof
subserve the public welfare, are for a “public purpose” and hence
a rightful subject of legislation. With this we cannot agree. To
accord validity to expenditures for an indiscriminate publicity
campaign upon the ground that it is for a public purpose would
do violence to that term as juridicially [sic] defined and dignify as
“public” what is purely “political.” 205
In its decision in Campbell, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai’i
ruminated on the powers in the Organic Act, as well as the plenary power
of Congress, over the Territories of the United States:
The Organic Act is silent upon the powers or duties of the local
legislature in respect to the exercise by Congress of its superior
202. Id. (quoting Campbell, 38 Haw. at 311–12). The specific language used by Senator
Campbell in her lawsuit was:
[T]he authority conferred by the Act upon the treasurer and auditor of the Territory
and the chairman of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, are “invalid, illegal,
discriminatory, contrary to public policy, not conducive to public welfare and are
not within the police powers of the Territory of Hawaii in that said moneys so
illegally expended and being illegally expended are used to aid private purposes
and individuals and are an illegal gift of public moneys to the proponents of
statehood for Hawaii and contrary to law; that said illegal expenditures heretofore
and now being made are to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers
of the Territory of Hawaii opposed to statehood for Hawaii.”
Campbell, 38 Haw. at 311.
203. Campbell, 38 Haw. at 311.
204. Id. at 315.
205. Id. at 315, 327.
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supervisory legislative control of the Territory. And the only legal
justification for the creation of the Hawaii Statehood Commission
and the conference upon it of the powers and duties enumerated
in section 2, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (so far as it affects the Federal
Government), 5 (so far as it applies to congressional legislation)
and 6 of the Act is, in our opinion, the right of petition as the
legislative representative of the citizens of Hawaii. To create an
agency to represent the citizens of Hawaii upon these subjects
before the Congress of the United States and such officers of the
Federal Government as may be involved upon federal legislation
pending or proposed affecting Hawaii is, in the final analysis, the
exercise of the right of petition reposed in the citizen and asserted
by the legislative representative of the citizen. 206
As the United States Supreme Court did in the Insular Cases, the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai’i made a distinction in
Campbell between fundamental rights and procedural or remedial
rights, which do not apply in the territories:
It is the sacred and inalienable right of the citizen to petition
those in governmental authority for a redress of grievances. . . .
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution assumes the
existence of the right and protects the citizen against its
encroachment by Congress. Hence it is that citizens of the
Territory may, without interference, petition the Congress of the
United States for statehood and for redress against
discriminatory legislation. This right of petition may be exercised
independently by private citizens or by their legislative
representatives. Petitions by the legislature of the Territory by
resolution duly adopted, memorializing and petitioning Congress
upon general subjects upon which that body has power to
legislate and in which the citizens of the United States locally
resident have a deep interest, have not been uncommon. It could
hardly be seriously argued that written petitions requesting
congressional legislation upon subjects to which we have
adverted might not be legally circulated among and signed by
individual citizens of this Territory and when so signed
forwarded to the National Congress for consideration. By the Act
in question the legislature of the Territory, within its powers to

206.

Id. at 316.
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legislate upon all rightful subjects of legislation of the Territory,
acted as the legislative representative of the citizens. 207
In the end, the strategic exception of Hawai’i after TID was announced
in the Insular Cases was not enough to quell the white supremacist
philosophy of territorial statehood. The racist body of law that developed
concerning the suitability of majority non-white populations in the
territories continues today—more than seventy years after the admission
of our fiftieth state—and clouds the horizon when contemplating the
likelihood of statehood for other contemporary statehood aspirants with
substantial non-white populations.
V. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: FEDERAL COLONIALISM
The official list of territories of the United States does not include the
District of Columbia. 208 Although the District of Columbia was initially
named the “Territory of Columbia” in September 1791, 209 it was renamed the District of Columbia in 1871 pursuant to James Madison’s
argument in Federalist No. 43 that the capital city of the United States
should be a federal district. 210 Nonetheless, the District of Columbia has
a great deal in common with the official territories of the United States.
As of 2021, the five official territories of the United States are American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the
United States Virgin Islands. 211 In addition to not being given
representation in the United States Congress, 212 like the territories, the

207. Id. at 316–19.
208. See Daniel A. Cotter, Territories of the United States, CONSTITUTING AM., https://
constitutingamerica.org/territories-of-the-united-states-guest-essayist-daniel-a-cotter/
#:~:text=Currently%2C%20the%20United%20States%20has,and%20the%20U.S.%20Virgi
n%20Islands (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
209. John Stewart, Early Maps and Surveyors of the City of Washington, D.C., in
RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 53 (1899).
210. See Daniel Ganninger, Why Is It Called the District of Columbia?, MEDIUM (July 7,
2020),
https://medium.com/knowledge-stew/why-is-it-called-the-district-of-columbia42c09a97529; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison); Becky Little, Why Isn’t
Washington, D.C. a State?, HISTORY (Apr. 22, 2021) https://www.history.com/news/
washington-dc-statehood-reconstruction.
211. Cotter, supra note 208.
212. Meagan Flynn & Julie Zauzmer Weil, Supreme Court Agrees D.C. Not Entitled to
Congressional Voting Representation, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2021, 5:18 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/10/04/supreme-court-dc-congress-vote/.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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majority of the population of the District of Columbia is also non-white. 213
Unlike all of the other territories, however, residents of the District of
Columbia have always been United States citizens, without need for
statutory permission, 214 and may cast ballots to elect the President of the
United States in the federal election every four years. 215
There is also the issue of differential treatment by the United States
Constitution regarding how and when territories and the District of
Columbia can be admitted for statehood:
There are a number of legal obstacles to D.C. statehood, to be
sure, which differ from those that encumber U.S. territories. For
D.C., at least three provisions of the U.S. Constitution are
implicated. As former Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.) wrote
recently for The Hill, Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution
provides that “New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union,” which has occurred 37 times in the nation’s history—
most recently in 1959, with the addition of Alaska and Hawaii.
Article 1, Section 8, clause 17 authorizes Congress to “exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the] District
(not exceeding ten Miles square),” and deems it “the Seat of
Government of the United States.” Finally, the 23rd
Amendment gives D.C. a “number of electors of President and
Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and
representatives in Congress to which the District would be
entitled if it were a State.” 216
Although “the House Committee on Oversight and Reform voted to pass
H.R. 51, which would grant statehood to the people of the District of
Columbia” in April 2021, “there is nothing in the original Constitution
that gives obvious ‘textualist’ grounds for a conservative-leaning
213. Race Data for City: District of Columbia, DC HEALTH MATTERS, https://
www.dchealthmatters.org/demographicdata?id=130951&sectionId=940 (last updated Jan.
2021). In 2021, 42.31% of the population in the District of Columbia identified as white,
with the remainder identifying as another race or as two or more races. Id.
214. FAQ, STATE OF WASHINGTON, D.C., https://statehood.dc.gov/page/faq (last visited
Jan. 3, 2022). Residents of American Samoa are United States nationals, not United States
citizens. See Amanda Pampuro, American Samoans Are Not Born into US Citizenship,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (June 16, 2021), https://www.courthousenews.com/americansamoans-are-not-born-into-us-citizenship/.
215. In 1961, the 23rd Amendment to the Constitution gave D.C. residents a say in the
presidential election. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
216. Kimberly Wehle, Not Granting DC and Puerto Rico Statehood Would be AntiDemocratic, HILL (May 18, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/554055not-granting-dc-and-puerto-rico-statehood-would-be-anti-democratic?amp/ (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17).
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Supreme Court to strike down Congress’s authority to legislate D.C.
statehood.” 217 Indeed, “[u]ntil 1801, D.C. residents had voting rights
through Maryland and Virginia . . . [and] nothing in the Constitution
retracts that right expressly.” 218 Thus, while the District of Columbia
does not have the same “imperial problem” as Puerto Rico, 219 by virtue of
the decisions in the Insular Cases, neither Congress nor the Article III
courts have sustained the claim that the citizens of the District of
Columbia have a constitutional right to full representation in our
democracy. 220
Of course, the District of Columbia is not only unique because it is a
federal district rather than a territory, but its issues are also distinct
from those of the territories in other ways. The fact that territorial
citizens may not vote in presidential elections, but the citizens of the
District of Columbia may is, of course, perhaps the most obvious
difference. 221 But once again, the racist history of the annexation of
several United States territories—specifically Guam, the Philippines,
Cuba, and Puerto Rico—is perhaps the most daunting when considering
the possibility of admission to statehood:
[F]rom the moment the U.S. annexed Guam, the Philippines,
Cuba, and Puerto Rico, statehood was out of the question. Racist
conceptions of island peoples as inferior, savage, and strange
foreclosed the possibility of statehood in the absence of white
settler colonies. But white Americans did not want to move to
these “primitive” islands. With statehood off the table, the
question facing the United States became how to effectively

217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
See LANNY THOMPSON, IMPERIAL ARCHIPELAGO: REPRESENTATION AND RULE IN THE
INSULAR TERRITORIES UNDER U.S. DOMINION AFTER 1898, at 24 (2010).
220. See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that
“constitutional text, history, and judicial precedent bar us from accepting plaintiffs’
contention that the District of Columbia may be considered a state for purposes of
congressional representation under Article I.”).
221. See Autumn Bordner, D.C. and Puerto Rico Are Not the Same., LEGAL PLANET (June
29, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/06/29/dc-and-puerto-rico-are-not-the-same/ (“With
passage of the D.C. statehood bill in the House of Representatives last Friday, variations
on this statement have been gaining traction as a liberal rallying cry. Because they are not
states, neither D.C. nor Puerto Rico have voting representation in Congress. The votes of
Puerto Rico’s 3.2 million citizens also do not count in U.S. presidential elections (thanks to
a constitutional amendment, D.C. citizens have been able to vote for President since
1961).”).
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maintain dominance over its strategically important new
possessions without fully bringing them into the Union. 222
As noted previously, although there are similarities between the
treatment of the territories in the continental United States and the de
facto requirement that the majority of the citizens of the territorial
population be white, 223 continental territories were put on a path to
presumptive statehood that the others—with the exception of Hawai’i—
were not. 224 The culture of white supremacy in Congress concerning
statehood does not only prohibit the provision of full membership to the
territorial “alien races,” 225 but extends to the struggle for statehood to the
District of Columbia—a federal district where the citizenry is a majorityminority jurisdiction. 226
VI. CONCLUSION
As historian Paul Frymer has noted, the modern quest for statehood
by territorial and federal colonial protectorates of the United States not
only “fits into this long historical pattern,” but coincides with a larger
moment of historical and racial reckoning:
In the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing, Americans are having
an exceptional collective moment of self-reflection and historical
recognition of the nation’s often exclusionary and racist past.
Protesters and politicians alike are taking down statues and

222. Id.
223. See supra Part III.A.1.
224. See supra Part IV; Bordner, supra note 221 (“The United States claimed Puerto
Rico along with Guam, Cuba, and the Philippines as spoils of the Spanish American War.
At that time, annexed territories on the continent were automatically placed on a ‘path to
statehood.’ The Constitution applied in full in these territories and their inhabitants were
extended U.S citizenship and voting rights. Then, once territories were sufficiently
‘American’ in character—meaning enough Native people had been exterminated or
dispossessed and enough white people had settled there—the territories would be granted
full statehood. Hawai’i, which was annexed the same year as Puerto Rico, but which already
was home to a substantial class of white capitalists, was placed on the path to statehood
the same as territories on the continent.”).
225. Id. (“[A]pplying the Constitution in Puerto Rico would lead to an absurd result: It
would mean that territorial inhabitants, whether ‘savage or civilized’ would be ‘entitled to
all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens.’ This could not be. Clearly, the ‘alien
races’ of the territories did not deserve the benefits of ‘Anglo-Saxon principles of
government.’” (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279, 287 (1901)).
226. See Nadra Kareem Nittle, Which 4 States Have the Most People of Color?,
THOUGHTCO. (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.thoughtco.com/states-with-majority-minoritypopulations-2834515.
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As Stacey Plaskett, Congressional Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands,
has powerfully reflected, citizens of the United States territories deserve
equal protection of our laws. 228 Congresswoman Plaskett argues that
territorial citizens “deserve nothing less than the full rights of
citizenship, including the right to vote.” 229 She also points out that this
unequal treatment is just one more manifestation of our culture of white
supremacy—noting that “[m]ore than 98 percent of these territorial
residents are racial or ethnic minorities . . . a fact that cannot be a mere
coincidence as our continuing disenfranchisement extends well past the
century mark.” 230
The issues of citizenship, race, and statehood, when viewed through
the lens of the racist TID and the white supremacist legacy of the Insular
Cases, make a powerful case for the abolition of these doctrines as we
consider the current statehood bids of Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia, as well as the potential admission of the other United States
territories in the future. If the United States is to become a truly
representative democracy, the inclusion of the territories as full members
of our society is essential to begin righting the wrongs of the past and
extending equal protection of the law to our fellow citizens and nationals
of the territories.

227. See Frymer, supra note 140.
228. See Stacey Plaskett, The Second-Class Treatment of U.S. Territories Is UnAmerican, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/
give-voting-rights-us-territories/618246/.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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